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FOLLOWING DIGITAL MEDIA INTO THE COURTROOM:  
PUBLICITY AND THE OPEN COURT PRINCIPLE IN THE INFORMATION AGE 
Shauna Hall-Coates* 
ABSTRACT 
Despite the pervasive integration of technology into various social institutions, 
one public body—the courtroom—has largely resisted such efforts. This 
separation is collapsing, however, as trial spectators increasingly arrive at court 
expecting to use their handheld digital devices inside to publish information 
about trials in real-time on live-blogging platforms. Consequently, Canadian 
courts have been forced to grapple with what role, if any, digital media is to 
play within their walls as this new information age puts pressure on a centuries-
old legal tradition. 
This article examines the debate on the use of digital devices in the 
courtroom from the perspective of the “open court principle,” as articulated 
in both law and general jurisprudential theory. It argues that using digital media 
as a platform to disseminate courtroom narratives has the potential to 
strengthen many of the open court principle’s foundational values, including 
accessibility, judicial accountability, and freedom of speech. These benefits 
may nonetheless come at a cost to the open court’s normative functions, since 
multiple, non-linear courtroom narratives created by digital media can 
undermine the publication of clear, determinate norms around which people 
can structure their lives. Accordingly, this article suggests that in deciding 
whether to permit digital media use in the courtroom, the justice system must 
determine which of the democratic values that underpin the open court 
principle ought to be given decisive weight in modern society. 
Citation: (2015) 24 Dal J Leg Stud 101. 
                                                                                                                                            
*  Shauna Hall-Coates is a graduate of the Schulich School of Law, Dalhousie University, where she received 
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INTRODUCTION 
An incontrovertible truth of the modern age is that technology has been, 
and will undoubtedly continue to be, one of the defining characteristics of 21st 
century life. In Canada, individuals increasingly live their lives with the Internet 
literally at their fingertips, as the proliferation of digital technologies in 
increasingly diminutive forms has made it possible to stay connected at any time 
and from any location. Yet despite the pervasive integration of technology into 
various social institutions, one dimension of civil society—the courtroom—has 
remained relatively immune from technology’s noisy demands for recognition. 
Walk into any courtroom today, critics venture, and it will look stunningly similar 
to those of the past; the judge will be sitting behind the bench, the jury in its box, 
and the witness on the stand.1 As everyone settles into his or her place selected 
by centuries of ritual and status quo, the courtroom may even appear as a 
sanctuary from the trappings of digital technology, so doggedly pursued outside 
its walls.  
This segregation between the courtroom and digital technology is 
nonetheless collapsing, as trial spectators increasingly arrive to court expecting 
that they will be able to use their digital devices inside to publish information 
about the trial in real-time through social media such as Twitter and other live-
blogging platforms. Moreover, despite the judicial system’s wariness of digital 
media technologies, their integration into the courtroom is strongly supported on 
the basis of the “open court” principle—that venerated ideal within the English 
justice system that holds court proceedings must be open to the public and that 
publicity as to those proceedings must be unconstrained. As a result, courts across 
Canada have been forced to grapple with what role, if any, digital media 
technology is to play within the modern casting of the open court principle, and 
who, if anyone, is given recourse to its use in the courtroom. 
Entering this critical fray, this article examines the debate on both sides of 
the coin for the inclusion and exclusion of digital devices and the attendant use 
of social media within the courtroom, based primarily on its accordance with the 
                                                                                                                                            
1  Chief Justice Beverley McLachlin, “The Relationship Between the Courts and the Media” (Speech 
delivered at Carleton University, 31 January 2012), online: <www.scc-csc.ca/court-cour/judges-juges/spe-
dis/bm-2012-01-31-eng.aspx>. 
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theoretical and legal underpinnings of the open court principle as they exist at the 
level of both Canadian law and general jurisprudential theory. At its root, this 
article rejects critics’ suggestion that social media use within the courtroom merely 
acts as the 21st century equivalent of the reporter’s pen and paper, and thus does 
not represent a radical break from past journalistic practices. On the contrary, this 
article argues that these platforms create wholly new and challenging courtroom 
narratives, characterized by the immediacy, interactivity, abundance, and 
permanence of the information disseminated through them. Likewise, since the 
Internet has democratized information dissemination, these courtroom narratives 
may be increasingly relayed in jurisdictions where it is permitted, such as Nova 
Scotia, by anonymous civilians who remain deeply unaccountable to a 
professional or organizational body in a manner commensurate with the 
accredited media. 
Accordingly, the revolutionary nature of this information dissemination 
platform exposes both digital media’s promises and problems in relation to the 
normative values that support the open court principle. The normative values 
underpinning the open court principle are complex, and deliberation on them is 
found in canonical Supreme Court of Canada case law, as well as in the writings 
of legal philosophers and critics such as Jeremy Bentham, Lon L. Fuller, and 
Jeremy Waldron. Distilled to their bare essence, the values of the open court 
principle centre on the self-legitimization of the judicial system in a democratic 
system of governance and the self-determination of individuals in a functioning 
democracy. This latter value involves the dual-pronged ability of citizens to self-
govern according to a clear understanding of their legal entitlements and 
obligations within a democratic order, while simultaneously being free to publicly 
question the efficacy and legitimacy of these same laws to which they know that 
they are coercively beholden.  
Using digital media as a platform to disseminate courtroom narratives has 
the potential to strengthen many of the open court principle’s foundational 
values, including accessibility, accountability of the judiciary, and freedom of 
speech. However, even as digital publicity in all its multiple, non-linear narratives 
has the profound ability to increase discursive debate, it undermines the 
104 DIGITAL MEDIA IN THE COURTROOM Vol. 24 
publication of clear, determinate norms around which people can structure their 
lives. This argument is heavily steeped in humans’ troublesome online truth-
seeking practices and in critics’ suggestions that digital media is a constant, and 
perhaps unavoidable, purveyor of misinformation in society. Accordingly, this 
article suggests that in deciding whether to integrate digital media use within the 
courtroom, the justice system must determine which of the democratic values 
that underpin the open court principle ought to be given decisive weight in 
modern society. Once the judicial door has been opened to use of digital media, 
it is legally and practically difficult to close the door, given that the test to obtain 
a common law publication ban is onerous, and cries of censorship target judges 
who refuse to accommodate the multiplicity of perspectives that social media’s 
proponents celebrate. Consequently, the wariness of some Canadian courts to 
welcome digital media technology into their fold may be prudent in light of this 
technology’s capacity to problematize fulfillment of the very core values they hold 
as sacrosanct. 
I. THE OPEN COURT PRINCIPLE AND PUBLICITY OF LAW 
In any constitutional climate, the administration of justice  
thrives on exposure to light—and withers under a cloud of secrecy.  
—JUSTICE FISH IN TORONTO STAR NEWSPAPERS LTD V ONTARIO2 
A.  The Open Court Principle and the Integrity of the Justice System 
At its crux, the open court principle holds that the public is to enjoy free 
access to the courts of justice and is presumptively entitled to attend and observe 
any court hearing.3 The open court principle is often said to rest on the maxim 
that justice can “only be truly done if it is seen to be done.”4 Legal philosophy 
has long drawn this connection between the concept of justice and the value of 
transparency, insisting that the former is meaningless without the latter.5 
                                                                                                                                            
2  Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd v Ontario, 2005 SCC 41 at para 1, [2005] SCR 188 [Toronto Star]. 
3  McLachlin, supra note 1.  
4  R v Sussex Justice, [1924] 1 KB 256 at 259. 
5  The open court principle is said to have received rhetorical support from legal scholars like Sir Matthew 
Hale, William Blackstone and Jeremy Bentham: see e.g. Allen M Linden, “Limitations on Media Coverage 
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Throughout history, theorists including 19th century English philosopher Jeremy 
Bentham were skeptical of the court system because it was, and is, the sole arm 
of democratic government not held publicly accountable through the electoral 
process.6 Insistence that the courts remain open to public scrutiny thus 
functioned as a check on what would otherwise be the untrammeled and 
unaccountable exercise of power by unelected judges.7  
Capturing this sentiment, Bentham wrote in an oft-quoted passage, 
In the darkness of secrecy, sinister intent and evil in every shape have 
full swing. Only in proportions as publicity has place can the checks 
applicable to judicial injustice operate. Where there is no publicity, 
there is no justice. Publicity is the very soul of justice. It is the keenest 
spur to exertion and the surest of all guards against probity. It keeps 
the judge himself while trying under trial.8 
Implicit in Bentham’s words is the aforementioned maxim that holds justice rests 
on public perception, as the legitimacy of judicial power arises from the public’s 
collective confidence in the legal system’s capacity to serve as an impartial and 
independent arbiter of rights. The Supreme Court of Canada wrote these 
observations into law in Vancouver Sun (Re), noting, 
Openness is necessary to maintain the independence and impartiality 
of courts. It is integral to public confidence in the justice system and 
the public’s understanding of the administration of justice. Moreover, 
openness is a principal component of the legitimacy of the judicial 
process and why the parties and the public at large abide by the 
decisions of courts.9 
                                                                                                                                            
of Legal Proceedings: A Critique and Some Proposals for Reform” in Phillip Anisman & Allen M Linden, 
eds, The Media, The Courts and the Charter (Toronto: Carswell, 1986) at 302. 
6  Hon CJ Marilyn Warren, “Open Justice in the Technological Age” (2013) 40 Monash UL Rev 45 at 46.  
7  Ibid. Likewise, in Peter W Hogg & Allison A Bushnell, “The Charter Dialogue Between Courts and 
Legislatures (Or Perhaps The Charter of Rights Isn’t Such a Bad Thing After All)” (1997) 35 Osgoode Hall 
LJ 75 at 77, the authors note that under the Charter judges “neither elected to their offices nor accountable 
for their actions are vested with the power to strike down laws that have been made by the duly elected 
representatives of the people.” Concern for the legitimacy of judiciary in the face of its amplified 
democratic power in the post-Charter era may be correspondingly said to be particularly acute. 
8  Jeremy Bentham, Rationale of Judicial Evidence, ed, John Stuart Mill (Edinburg: Bowring, 1827) at 355.  
9  Vancouver Sun (Re), 2004 SCC 43 at para 25, [2004] 2 SCR 332. 
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Publicity is therefore a critical component of the justice system’s claim to 
legitimacy because it makes the judiciary itself worthy of standing as a democratic 
institution, despite its exclusion from an electoral process that normally mediates 
the relationship between citizens and the state.10 
Although the open court principle protects the self-legitimizing interests of 
the justice system, it also protects the right of citizens to receive a fair trial under 
section 11(d) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.11 Crucially, a closed 
court system runs the risk that parties who wield social or political power, 
including the government, could use it to “circumvent public policies, 
accountability, and basic notions of procedural fairness.”12 Concern for the abuse 
of the administration of justice is particularly acute in the criminal law context 
where a prosecuting government threatens an accused’s constitutionally 
protected liberty interests with infinitely larger resources at its disposal.13  
Publicity, once again, steps into frame as a mechanism to safeguard 
procedural integrity, as Bentham noted that having a trial conducted in public 
view compels judges to ensure justice is properly administered in their 
courtrooms to avoid public accusations of incompetence or impropriety.14 In R v 
Legal Aid Board, Lord Woolf of the English Court of Appeal summed up this 
sentiment in similar terms:  
[The open court principle] enables the public to know that justice is 
being administered impartially. It can result in evidence becoming 
available which would not become available if the proceedings were 
conducted behind closed doors or with one or more of the parties’ or 
witnesses’ identity concealed. […] If secrecy is restricted to those 
situations where justice would be frustrated if the cloak of anonymity 
is not provided, this reduces the risk of the sanction of contempt 
                                                                                                                                            
10  Warren, supra note 6 at 46. 
11  David M Paciocco, “When Open Courts Meet Closed Government” (2005) 2 Sup Ct L Rev 385 at 387. 
12  Trevor C Farrow, “Public Justice, Private Dispute Resolution and Democracy” (2008) Comparative 
Research in Law & Political Economy, Research Paper No 18/2008 at 49, online: <digitalcommons. 
osgoode.yorku.ca/clpe/192>. 
13  Dana Adams, “Access Denied? Inconsistent Jurisprudence on the Open Court Principle and Media Access 
to Exhibits in Canadian Criminal Cases” (2012) 49 Alta L Rev 177 at 180. 
14  Warren, supra note 6 at 46. 
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having to be invoked, with the expense and the interference with the 
administration of justice which this can involve.15 
In this way, the open court principle defends the interests of the accused by 
ensuring procedural protections are granted, including adherence to the principles 
of natural justice, while keeping the judicial players—the judge, jury, and 
counsel—“intellectually honest” by guaranteeing their actions are a matter of 
public record.16  
B.  Freedom of Information: Autonomy and Public Discourse 
As David Paciocco notes, the concept of open court is misleading if it is 
thought of simply in terms of enabling the public’s physical “access to [the] wood-
paneled rooms” of the courthouse.17 Although the “first facet” of open court is 
the public’s right to attend trials and court proceedings,18 the principle is 
fundamentally an expansive liberty doctrine that covers the public’s freedom to 
access and disseminate information about the law, including judicial 
proceedings.19 The Supreme Court of Canada has explicitly recognized this 
informational freedom as fundamental to the fair functioning of the legal system 
and to the democratic system of governance as a whole. In Named Person v 
Vancouver Sun, Justice Bastarache wrote: 
Information is at the heart of any legal system. Police investigate crimes 
and act on information they acquire; lawyers and witnesses present 
information to courts; juries and judges make decisions based on that 
information; and those decisions, reported by the popular and legal 
press, make up the basis of the law in future cases. In Canada, as in any 
truly democratic society, the courts are expected to be open, and information is 
expected to be available to the public.20  
                                                                                                                                            
15  R v Legal Aid Board, ex parte Kaim Todner (a firm), [1999] QB 966 at para 4 (CA).  
16  Willard Z Estey, “Freedom of Expression vs The Individual’s Right to Privacy,” (Speech delivered at the 
Empire Club of Canada, Toronto, 21 April 1994) in The Empire Club of Canada: Addresses 1993–1994 
(Toronto: The Empire Club of Canada, 1994) 412 at 426. 
17  Paciocco, supra note 11 at 388. 
18  Vickery v Nova Scotia Supreme Court (Prothonotary), [1991] 1 SCR 671 at para 49, 104 NSR (2d) 181 [Vickery]. 
19  Paciocco, supra note 11 at 388. 
20  Named Person v Vancouver Sun, 2007 SCC 43 at para 1, [2007] 3 SCR 253 [emphasis added]. 
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Hence, whereas the first facet of the open court principle underscores the 
physical permeability of the courthouse, its second facet underscores its 
conceptual permeability, as information originating inside the courthouse flows 
outward into full public view under this doctrine. In practical terms, this 
“common law right of access” means that any non-privileged information that a 
court receives or produces should be available to the public,21 including any 
“material that is relevant to [a court proceeding’s] resolution.”22 While accounts 
of witness testimony, interim deliberations, and final judgments are all made a 
matter of public record in the name of this principle, evidence relied upon during 
a court proceeding, including executed search warrants23 and trial exhibits,24 is 
also made available to the public on this basis.  
By protecting freedom of information, the open court principle 
fundamentally enables the public to achieve two interrelated, democratic social 
values. Firstly, the publicity of legal information informs citizens as to the extent 
of their legal rights and obligations.25 This knowledge enables people to 
understand how the justice system might deal with future legal issues arising from 
their rights, should they ever find themselves facing a court of law.26 Secondly, 
armed with this knowledge, citizens can publically question the efficacy and 
legitimacy of these laws to which they now know they are coercively beholden.  
The Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in R v Mentuck illustrates this point 
by focusing on the twin values of self-governance and public discourse borne out 
of the open court principle.27 In Mentuck, an accused murderer was arrested after 
the RCMP conducted an undercover “Mr. Big” sting operation. This policing 
method remains controversial because it induces self-conscription of criminal 
suspects at the hands of the state.28 Fearing that public knowledge of the 
operational methods employed by the officers would undermine the effectiveness 
                                                                                                                                            
21  Vickery, supra note 18 at para 77. 
22  Sierra Club of Canada v Canada (Minister of Finance), 2002 SCC 41 at para 1, 211 DLR (4th) 193. 
23  Nova Scotia (AG) v MacIntyre, [1982] 1 SCR 175, 49 NSR (2d) 609. 
24  Canadian Broadcasting Corp v R, 2010 ONCA 726, 102 OR (3d) 673. 
25  Edmonton Journal v Alberta (AG), [1989] 2 SCR 1326 at para 10, 103 AR 321 [Edmonton Journal].  
26  Ibid. 
27  R v Mentuck, 2001 SCC 76, [2001] 3 SCR 76 [Mentuck]. 
28  See e.g. R v Hart, 2014 SCC 52, [2014] 2 SCR 544. 
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of future investigations, the prosecutors sought a publication ban to suppress this 
information. The Supreme Court unanimously denied this request, stating that 
the public airing of these techniques was vital to public edification and 
deliberation. Writing for the Court, Justice Iacobucci stated: 
As this Court recognized in Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney General) 
[citations omitted], “participation in social and political decision-
making is to be fostered and encouraged” [as] a principle fundamental 
to a free and democratic society. […] Such participation is an empty 
exercise without the information…about the practices of government, 
including the police. In my view, a publication ban that restricts the 
public’s access to information about the one government body that 
publicly wields instruments of force and gathers evidence for the 
purpose of imprisoning suspected offenders would have a serious 
deleterious effect. There is no doubt as to how crucial the role of the 
police is to the maintenance of law and order and the security of 
Canadian society. But there has always been and will continue to be a 
concern about the limits of acceptable police action. The improper use 
of bans regarding police conduct, so as to insulate that conduct from 
public scrutiny, seriously deprives the Canadian public of its ability to 
know of and be able to respond to police practices that, left unchecked, 
could erode the fabric of Canadian society and democracy.29  
Elsewhere in the judgment, Justice Iacobucci underscored the deliberative 
function of informational freedom, noting that a ban on the information 
fundamentally “prevents the public from being informed critics of what may be 
controversial police actions.”30 In reaching this conclusion, the Supreme Court 
reveals its self-perceived obligation to provide the public with the information 
necessary to enable individuals to organize their thought, behaviour, and speech 
around the state’s coercive powers. The open court principle thus plays an 
essential function in the democratic order by educating the public on their legal 
rights, while simultaneously facilitating public discussion regarding the nature and 
limit of these civic entitlements and obligations. 
Pushing the analysis of these dual democratic functions of the open court 
system further, Lon L. Fuller’s naturalist account of law in The Morality of the Law 
(1964) highlights the value of legal transparency by grounding it in a relationship 
                                                                                                                                            
29  Mentuck, supra note 27 at para 51. 
30  Ibid at para 50 [emphasis added]. 
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of reciprocity between the lawmaker and the legal subject. In Fuller’s account of 
the law, citizens are not simply members of a submissive population, blindly 
following the will of the state.31 Instead, they are legal agents capable of purposive 
action in society and ordered by law as a distinctive mode of governance separate 
and apart from rule by men.32 As a mode of governance, law crucially presupposes 
legal subjects’ agency and communicates both recognition and respect for law by 
constituting itself in full observance of eight intrinsic, formal attributes, which 
Fuller describes as the law’s “internal morality.”33 Among Fuller’s eight canons is 
the formal principle of “clarity” or “publicity,” which holds that laws must be 
made public to citizens in a meaningful way.34 Publicity consequently demands 
that the state govern with clear and determinate legal norms that are not kept 
“hidden away in the closets of bureaucracy”35 or contained within the shadows 
of deliberate state obfuscation.36  
Although The Morality of the Law includes few references to courtroom 
procedure,37 Fuller’s concept of publicity emphasizes the values of self-
governance and deliberative democracy that publicity makes possible in a manner 
that both echoes and deepens the Supreme Court’s analysis of the open court 
principle in Mentuck. In order to appreciate what Fuller brings to the debate over 
the use of digital media in Canadian courtrooms, first one must understand that 
a profound sense of reciprocity exists between the legal subject and the lawmaker 
in Fuller’s account of the law. As a result, for the law to be law it must convey 
itself to legal subjects in a formal manner that recognizes the subject’s capacity 
                                                                                                                                            
31  Kristen Rundle, Forms Liberate: Reclaiming the Jurisprudence of Lon L Fuller (Oregon: Hart Publishing, 2012) 1 
at 2. 
32  Ibid. 
33  Ibid. 
34  Ibid. 
35  Jeremy Waldron, “The Rule of Law and the Importance of Procedure” (2010) New York University Public 
Law and Legal Theory Working Papers, Paper 234 at 1, online: <lsr.nellco.org/nyu_plltwp/234>. 
36  Critics including David Dyzenhaus have pointed out that Fuller’s account of publicity involves a moral 
requirement on the part of the lawmaker to engaged in reasoned justification of the law’s content; see e.g. 
David Dyzenhaus, “The Rule of Law as the Rule of Liberal Principle” in Ronald Dworkin, ed, Arthur 
Ripstein (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007) at 74. This supposition accords with Fuller’s 
position that when individuals are compelled to explain and justify their decisions the effect is to “pull 
these them towards goodness”; see “Positivism and Fidelity to Law – A Reply to Professor Hart” (1950) 
71 Harv L Rev 630 at 636. An analysis of reasoned justification in Fuller’s work is beyond the scope of this 
article, but it is worth underscoring that Fuller’s concept of publicity has received a series of varied 
jurisprudential interpretations given its evocative and indeterminate nature. 
37  Waldron, supra note 35 at 8. 
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for self-governance, free from direct state intervention.38 Moreover, in providing 
discursive space for the self-application of its norms, the law demonstrates 
respect for individuals’ inherent human dignity as beings capable of self-
determination and self-control.39 Fuller writes:  
To embark on the enterprise of subjecting human conduct to rules 
involves of necessity a commitment to the view that man is, or can 
become, a responsible agent, capable of understanding and following 
rules and answerable for his defaults. Every departure from the 
principles of law’s morality is an affront to man’s dignity as a 
responsible agent. To judge his actions by unpublished or retrospective 
laws, or to order him to do an act that is impossible, is to convey…your 
indifference to his powers of self-determination.40 
As the law constitutes itself in recognition of humans’ capacity for self-
governance, it operates “by using, rather than short-circuiting, the agency of 
ordinary human individuals. [It] count[s] on people’s capacities for practical 
understanding, for self-control, for self-monitoring and modulation of their own 
behavio[u]r in relation to norms that they can grasp and understand.”41 
Correspondingly, it is only when the law constitutes itself in a formal manner that 
affirms its commitment to human autonomy that individuals gain a reciprocal 
obligation to recognize the law as law and follow its demands.42  
Since law constitutes itself based on a “dignitarian conception of the legal 
subject as an agent capable of monitoring and freely governing his [or her] own 
conduct,”43 publicity is valued for providing citizens with clear, determinative 
                                                                                                                                            
38  Waldron points out that citizens’ obedience to law is rarely the result of physical coercion, as litigants often 
pay court awards without the intervention of bailiffs and criminally accused persons show up to court on 
their own recognizance: see Jeremy Waldron, “How Law Protects Dignity” (2012) 71:1 Cambridge LJ 200 
at 206. 
39  Fuller is not alone in linking the law’s determinative content with the recognition of human autonomy. 
Joseph Raz similarly wrote in “The Value of the Rule of Law,” “[o]bservance of the rule of law is 
necessary if the law is to respect human dignity. Respecting human dignity entails treating humans as 
persons capable of planning and plotting their future. Thus, respecting people’s dignity includes respecting 
their autonomy, their right to control their future”: see e.g. “The Rule of Law and its Virtue” in The 
Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality (UK: Clarendon Press, 1979) at 221. 
40  Lon Fuller, Morality of Law (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969) at 162.  
41  Waldron, supra note 35 at 206. 
42  Rundle, supra note 31 at 3. 
43  Waldron, supra note 35 at 18. 
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legal norms around which to structure their lives.44 At its crux, publicity lends 
stability and reliability to citizens’ lives insofar as they are able to anticipate the 
legal outcomes of their actions.45 The freedom enjoyed on the basis of publicity 
has consequently been termed a private one, as legal clarity, determinacy, and 
predictability offer individuals the personal freedom to pursue a course of 
conduct by reference to their calculation of its legal risks and rewards.46 As a 
result, critics have held that the clear articulation of law’s normative content is 
vital to the rule of law, insofar as it provides certainty to the lives of citizens while 
simultaneously conveying respect for their powers of self-determination.47 
Individualistic self-governance aside, the publicity of law has additionally 
been cited by critics as having a broader, more collective social function in a 
democratic order. Within this critical fray, Jeremy Waldron criticizes 
interpretation of Fuller’s formalist principles as relating solely to self-governance 
at the expense of collective action.48 In “The Rule of Law and the Importance of 
Procedure,” Waldron disapproves of a simplistic account of law as determinate 
content, dispatched by the sovereign for public edification and obedience. He 
writes, “[the] fallacy of modern positivism, it seems to me, is its exclusive 
emphasis on the command-and-control aspect of law, or the norm-and-guidance 
aspect of law, without any reference to the culture of argument that a legal system 
frames, sponsors and institutionalizes.”49  
For Waldron, the law is not simply a source of inflexible and entrenched 
command, but “a matter of argument” in and of itself.50 Put differently, the law 
is not simply determined by a judge and passed down to the subject from on high. 
Rather, the law is fundamentally shaped in and beyond the courtroom when 
…ordinary people and their representatives take advantage of [the legal 
system’s] aspiration to systematicity and integrity in framing their own 
legal arguments…. These are not just arguments about what the law 
ought to be—made, as it were, in a sort of lobbying mode. They are 
                                                                                                                                            
44  Colleen Murphy, “Lon Fuller and the Moral Value of the Moral of Law” (2004) 24 Law & Phil 239 at 241. 
45  Ibid. 
46  Waldron, supra note 35 at 18. 
47  Ibid. 
48  Ibid at 20. 
49  Ibid. 
50  Ibid at 17. 
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arguments of reason presenting competing arguments about what the 
law is. Inevitably, they are controversial: one party will say that such-
and-such a proposition cannot be inferred from the law as it is; the 
other party will respond that it can be so inferred if only we credit the 
law with more coherence…. And so the determination of whether 
such a proposition has legal authority may often be a matter of 
contestation.51 
According to Waldron, recognizing that the law is the site of civic contestation 
and resistance to dominant interpretations underscores a second dignitarian 
aspect of law, as it conceives of  
…people who live under [law] as bearers of reason and intelligence. 
They are thinkers who can grasp and grapple with the rationale of the 
way they are governed and relate it in complex but intelligible ways to 
their own view of the relation between their actions and purposes and 
the actions and purposes of the state.52  
As laws are the subject of constant interpretation and debate, legal publicity serves 
a discursive function in democratic society by enabling “active engagement in the 
administration of public affairs, the freedom to participate actively and 
argumentatively in the way that one is governed.”53 Public institutions are thus 
compelled under this democratic concept of the law—as the Supreme Court 
appeared to identify in Mentuck—to “sponsor and facilitate reasoned argument in 
human affairs.”54 Ultimately, as publicity of the law lends predictability, stability, 
and determinacy to human lives by revealing its positive content in the eyes of 
the sovereign, it simultaneously subjects these laws “to scrutiny and opens them 
to public criticism, political demonstrations, active and passive resistance, and 
friction.”55  
                                                                                                                                            
51  Ibid [emphasis in original]. 
52 Ibid [emphasis in original]. 
53  Ibid at 18. 
54  Ibid. 
55  David Luban, “The Rule of Law and Human Dignity: Reexamining Fuller’s Canons” (2010) 2 Hague J on 
Rule L 29 at 35. Moreover, in Part IV of this article we will see how publicity as defined legal content and 
deliberative legal discourse can come into tension with one another through the involvement of digital 
media in the courtroom.  
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C.  Freedom of Speech and the Open Court Principle 
Each aspect of the open court principle discussed above, including its 
preservation of physical access to the courtroom and the promotion of 
informational freedom in the service of self-governance and deliberative 
discourse, converge with its constitutional protection in the freedom of 
expression guarantee under section 2(b) of the Charter. Section 2(b) guarantees 
freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression, including freedom of the 
press and other media of communication.56 The protection of a free press within 
section 2(b) is vital to the functioning of the open court principle because, despite 
jurisprudential veneration, it is widely accepted that few Canadians have the time, 
resources, or will to attend court personally.57 Open in principle but closed as a 
matter of practicality, the justice system eludes its transparency promise without 
the intervention of an intermediary dedicated to the dissemination of legal 
information. 
The mass media, with its traditional hegemonic control over channels of 
information access and distribution, thus became the purveyor of legal 
information regarding court proceedings. In Edmonton Journal v Alberta (AG), the 
Supreme Court explicitly acknowledged the open court principle’s sustenance 
through media involvement: 
Those who cannot attend rely in large measure upon the press to 
inform them about court proceedings—the nature of the evidence that 
was called, the arguments presented, the comments made by the trial 
judge—in order to know not only what rights they may have, but how 
their problems might be dealt with in court. […] Discussion of court 
cases and constructive criticism of court proceedings is dependent 
upon the receipt by the public of information as to what transpired in 
court. Practically speaking, this information can only be obtained from the 
newspapers or other media.58 
                                                                                                                                            
56  Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada 
Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11, s 2(b). 
57  Adams, supra note 13 at 178. 
58  Edmonton Journal, supra note 25 at para 10 [emphasis added]. 
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Acting as the public’s “proxy”59 or “surrogate”60 in the courtroom, the media 
gathers the information necessary for public self-governance and deliberation, 
while simultaneously policing the administration of justice to prevent abuse by 
judicial actors.61  
Since it is “through the press that the vitally important concept of the open 
court is preserved,”62 the freedom of expression guarantee under section 2(b) has 
come to explicitly protect the role of the press in gaining access to court 
proceedings. In Canadian Broadcasting Corp v New Brunswick (AG), Justice La Forest 
stated:  
That the right of the public to information relating to court 
proceedings, and the corollary right to put forward opinions pertaining 
to the courts, depend on the freedom of the press to transmit this 
information is fundamental to an understanding of the importance of 
that freedom. The full and fair discussion of public institutions, which 
is vital to any democracy, is the raison d’être of the s. 2(b) guarantees. 
Debate in the public domain is predicated on an informed public, 
which is in turn reliant upon a free and vigorous press. The public’s 
entitlement to be informed imposes on the media the responsibility to inform fairly 
and accurately. This responsibility is especially grave given that the 
freedom of the press is, and must be, largely unfettered.63 
Honing in on the press’ unfettered access to the courts, this guarantee 
encompasses not only the right to transmit news, information and beliefs, but the 
right to gather this information “independent from any state imposed restrictions 
on content, form or perspective except those justified under s. 1 of the Charter.”64 
Under section 2(b), the public is also granted the reciprocal right to demand and 
receive information regarding court proceedings from the media, which in turn 
                                                                                                                                            
59  Vickery, supra note 18 at para 80. 
60  Edmonton Journal, supra note 25 at para 57. 
61  On this latter point, the Supreme Court in Edmonton Journal, supra note 25 at para 58 found that media’s 
presence in the courtroom also inspires confidence in litigants that the proper procedures are being 
followed and the results reached are fair.  
62  Vickery, supra note 18 at para 81. 
63  Canadian Broadcasting Corp v New Brunswick (AG), [1996] 3 SCR 480 at para 23, 182 NBR (2d) 81 [emphasis 
added] [CBC v NB]. 
64  Canadian Broadcasting Corp v Lessard, [1991] 3 SCR 421 at para 65, 67 CCC (3d) 517. 
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will form the content of their own constitutionally protected free speech. Again 
in Canadian Broadcasting Corp v New Brunswick (AG), Justice La Forest held: 
Openness permits public access to information about the courts, 
which in turn permits the public to discuss and put forward opinions 
and criticisms of court practices and proceedings. While the freedom 
to express ideas and opinions about the operation of the courts is 
clearly within the ambit of the freedom guaranteed by s. 2(b), so too is 
the right of members of the public to obtain information about the 
courts in the first place.65  
Put another way, section 2(b) protects “listeners” and “speakers,” both of whom 
have an equal right to claim unfettered access to information, even if such 
information is learned second-hand, and to discuss it freely.66 Ultimately, without 
the twinned protection of freedom of access and expression under section 2(b), 
the open court principle would be stifled in all its democratic aims. 
II. DIGITAL MEDIA AND THE MODERN COURTROOM  
The evening news has become men in suits and women in pearls reading Twitter to your grandparents. 
Twitter is faster than print media, more in depth than television, and compared to traditional newswire, 
it’s real-time reaction to events, news, and headlines.67 
—BARRY RITHOLTZ 
A.  Publicity and Mass Media in the Modern Age  
In the modern age, the open court principle is undergoing a marked 
transformation as technology has come to saturate all levels of society, causing 
vital aspects of human activity—including human communication and the mass 
media—to acquire a digital dimension.68 Humans live in an era in which 
information production, distribution, and storage have migrated online. Once 
                                                                                                                                            
65  CBC v NB, supra note 63 at para 23. 
66  Edmonton Journal, supra note 25 at para 10. 
67  Barry Ritholtz, “Twitter is Becoming the First and Quickest Source of Investment News”, The Guardian, 
(23 April 2013), online: The Guardian <www.theguardian.com/technology/2013/apr/23/twitter-first-
source-investment-news>. 
68  Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, “Big Data for All: Privacy and User Control in the Age of Analytics” 
(2013) 11 NW J Tech & Intell Prop 239 at 240. 
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online, information is disseminated at a scale and rate hitherto unachievable in a 
strictly paper-based information economy.69 In this digital community, 
individuals can not only access vast amounts of information in mere seconds, but 
can also connect to almost anyone, at any time, from any location.70 The manner 
in which communication, connectivity, and access to information is sought has 
thus transformed, as individuals are increasingly connected via a global network 
that transcends temporal and geographic borders. The expansive nature of this 
global information network is, paradoxically, matched by the diminutive nature 
of the technology through which it is accessed, as humans increasingly come to 
understand their world through portable electronic devices no larger than a 
human hand.  
As a result of the proliferation of digital technology and social media 
platforms, more people are producing and disseminating media content today 
than ever before in human history.71 With the increased supply of digital media 
content comes increased demand. As scholar Christina Locke Faubel explains, 
“[m]obile technologies such as smartphones and laptops enable instant, on-
demand news, and as the public rapidly adopts these technologies, the media 
works to supply coverage as quickly as possible.”72 Facing economic and cultural 
strains and a surge of digital readership, traditional mass media have increasingly 
ventured online in order to compete in the digital marketplace.73 However, the 
democratizing nature of the Internet has also simultaneously “blurred the lines 
between the traditional news media and regular citizens, as [I]nternet access and 
software make it possible for a single person, with very low overhead, to create 
content that is available globally.”74 Since anyone can now gain instant publicity 
online, individuals with no formal media affiliation or credentials are able to break 
                                                                                                                                            
69  Ibid. 
70  Hon Amy J St Eve & Michael A Zuckerman, “Ensuring an Impartial Jury in the Age of Social Media” 
(2012) 11 Duke L & Tech Rev 1 at 3. 
71  Karen Salaz, Thomas Hodson & Chris J Davey, “New Media and the Courts: The Current Status and a 
Look at the Future” (2010), online: CCPIO <www.ssrn.com/abstract=1666332>. 
72  Christina Locke Faubel, “Cameras in the Courtroom 2.0: How Technology is Changing the Way 
Journalists Cover the Courts” (2014) 3 Reynolds Ct & Media LJ 3. 
73  Mary Kissel, “The Decline of Print Doesn’t Mean the End of Journalism”, The Guardian (29 October 
2013), online: The Guardian <www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/oct/29/decline-print-media-
journalism-web>. 
74  Faubel, supra note 72 at 30.  
118 DIGITAL MEDIA IN THE COURTROOM Vol. 24 
news through their digital devices. The fact that the public is now empowered en 
masse to report the news was evidenced in 2013 when eyewitnesses of the Boston 
Marathon bombing broke news of the incident on Twitter within seconds of its 
occurrence. In doing so, these private citizens provided firsthand accounts of the 
event in real-time, well before traditional media outlets like CNN, Reuters, or the 
Associated Press were on the scene.75  
In this way, those armed with technology today assume a role traditionally 
reserved for vocational journalists, eroding the mass media’s hegemonic control 
as the public’s informational intermediary. Law professor Teresa Scassa notes:  
In an age where journalism was largely the province of organized media 
outlets, whether in print or broadcast media, journalism could be 
associated in an almost elliptical manner with the activities of paid 
journalists. Now, in an era in which almost anyone can participate in 
collecting and disseminating information without the need for 
membership, employment or affiliation with a media outlet or a guild, 
the concept of journalistic purposes has been disassociated from a 
particular vocation.76  
As the Internet has given voice to numerous non-traditional information sources, 
so has society seen the rise of “citizen journalists.” These “ordinary users engage 
in journalistic practices,” including current affairs-based blogging, photo and 
video sharing, and post eyewitness commentary on current events.77 Largely 
enabled by free and public online platforms like Twitter, individuals are able to 
document events as they unfold in real-time, and disseminate their observations 
to a wide online audience.78 Furthermore, along with the novel medium comes a 
                                                                                                                                            
75  Ritholtz, supra note 67.  
76  Teresa Scassa, “Journalistic Purposes and Private Sector Data Protection Legislation: Blogs, Tweets and 
Information Maps” (2010) 35 Queen’s LJ 733 at para 50. 
77  Melissa Wall, “Citizen Journalism: A Retrospective on What We Know, An Agenda For What We Don’t” 
(2015) Digital Journalism 1 at 2, DOI: 10.1080/21670811.2014.1002513. 
78  Twitter, whose mission is to “give everyone the power to create and share ideas and information instantly, 
without barriers,” has 288 million monthly active users, 80% of which access the platform through a 
mobile device. A “tweet” is a small burst of text limited to 140 characters, transmitted instantly from the 
author’s phone to an author’s followers, including members of the general public, professional 
organizations, companies, celebrities, and major media outlets. Twitter feeds can be embedded in websites, 
blogs, social networking sites, and other electronic platforms with wide audiences; see e.g. “Twitter Media” 
(2015), online: Twitter <media.twitter.com>. 
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novel narrative style, characterized by speed and a subjective tone of voice that 
can challenge those of the mainstream media.79  
B.  Digital Media in the Courtroom  
Despite technology’s proliferation in other areas of legal practice, critics 
charge that up until the 21st century, one “precinct of the law has largely foregone 
the use of technology: the normative, near-sacred heart—the courtroom.”80 
However, like never before, technology is penetrating the walls of the courtroom 
to assert its role within. Media law scholar Cathy Packer explains:  
The digital communication revolution has arrived in the nation’s 
courtrooms. Journalists and other courtroom observers now head to 
court with their smartphones, tablets, and other small computers, 
intending to photograph, blog and tweet the events they observe.81  
Crucially, social media platforms like Twitter, which enables live reporting from 
the courtroom, can be embedded in online newspapers and blogs, widening the 
scope of their readership. As Twitter allows individuals to broadcast instant 
written accounts of judicial proceedings to infinitely larger online audiences, 
tweeting from inside the courtroom has been said to become “de rigueur nowadays 
among court reporters […] especially in competitive markets.”82 Similarly, the 
President of the Quebec Federation of Journalists recently emphasized the 
growing role of digital media in court reporting, arguing that “Twitter is the tool 
of the 21st century and it allows journalists to bring the citizen into the 
courtroom.”83 
Responding to the increasing prevalence of digital media technology in 
courtrooms, legal critics have asserted that the practice of live-blogging a 
                                                                                                                                            
79  Wall, supra note 77 at 6. 
80  Fredric I Lederer, “Technology Comes to the Courtroom, and…” (1994) 43 Emory LJ 1095 at 1096. 
81  Cathy Packer, “Should Courtroom Observers Be Allowed to Use Their Smartphones and Computers in 
Court? An Examination of the Arguments” (2013) 36 Am J Trial Advoc 573 at 573. 
82  Ibid.  
83  The Canadian Press, “Quebec Bans Electronic Communications in Courtrooms”, CTV News (14 April 
2013), online: CTV News <www.ctvnews.ca/canada/quebec-bans-electronic-communications-in-
courtrooms-1.1237540>. 
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courtroom proceeding is simply the modern equivalent of traditional print 
journalism because this written communication does not include video or audio 
coverage of the trial, which remain prohibited.84 For example, in her defence of 
live-blogging in court, Cathy Packer notes that some in the American judiciary 
believe “smartphones and laptop computers [are] the twenty-first century 
equivalent of the reporter’s pen and paper—not…the equivalent of 
broadcasting.”85 The American Civil Liberties Association echoes this sentiment, 
arguing that “tweeting and social media are merely a 21st century version of what 
reporters have always done—gather information and disseminate it.”86 Still others 
have framed live-blogging’s continuity with journalism of the past in the most 
basic of technological terms, explaining that there is no difference between an 
individual live-blogging a court proceeding on his or her smartphone and a 
“person who walks out of the courtroom, gets on a pay phone, and tells someone 
what is going on, and then walks back into the courtroom. That’s the way media 
used to do it; this just speeds up the process.”87  
These characterizations of Twitter and live-blogging, meant to hold in 
abeyance worries that this technology smuggles the prohibited act of broadcasting 
into the courtroom, nevertheless fail to capture the profoundly unique aspects of 
this mode of publishing. At their core, Twitter and other real-time micro-blogging 
services inject radical immediacy into the reporting of courtroom proceedings, as 
any sight or speech in the courtroom can be typed and published within 
milliseconds of its occurrence by an observer. This technology’s immediacy thus 
allows individuals to access virtual “gavel-to-gavel” coverage of the proceeding 
unfolding before the observer’s eyes.88  
                                                                                                                                            
84  Broadcasting, defined as transmitting film or audio recordings of the proceedings, remains prohibited in all 
Canadian courtrooms. For more information, see Part III. 
85  Packer, supra note 81 at 584. 
86  Michael Tarm, “Judges, Journalists Clash over Courtroom Tweets; Debate Highlighted by Celebrity 
Murder Case”, The Associated Press (16 April 2012), online: Global News <www.globalnews.ca/news/ 
234500/judges-journalists-clash-over-courtroom-tweets-debate-highlighted-by-celebrity-murder-case>. 
87  Gary Toohey, “Small Size, Big Problems: Smartphones in the Courtroom”, Precedent (Winter 2013) 17, 
online: Missouri Bar Association <www.mobar.org/uploadedFiles/Home/Publications/Precedent/ 
2013/Winter/smartphones.pdf>. 
88  Geordon Omand, “Tweeting From Courtroom Impresses Nova Scotia Top Judge”, Toronto Star (28 July 
2014), online: The Toronto Star <www.thestar.com/news/canada/2014/07/28/tweeting_from_ 
courtroom_impresses_nova_scotia_top_judge.html>. 
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Moreover, this technology can transmit witness testimony verbatim, easily 
typed out in short bursts of Twitter prose. Arguments made by lawyers or 
statements uttered by judges may also intersperse this play-by-play narrative, 
sometimes juxtaposed with links to photographs of trial exhibits,89 or out-of-
court videos or images supplied by the author for illustrative purposes.90 These 
feeds also describe the appearance, demeanour, and interactions of the parties, 
witnesses, and members of the court, capturing what one critic termed a “playful 
mix of colo[u]rful details and inane minutiae.”91 The detailed nature of this 
information thus turns the trial coverage from an editorial or newspaper article 
into a highly augmented transcript, published on the Internet for the world to see. 
As a result, certain critics have argued this play-by-play coverage, in its 
informational immediacy and volume, offers “an alternative perspective on the 
trial” rather than a continuation of past publishing practices.92 
Differing from traditional media by virtue of their continuous and 
unconstrained streams of information, tweeting and live-blogging diverge from 
print media in two more critical respects. Firstly, there is no editorial oversight on 
the information being disseminated for non-members of the accredited media. 
Critic Adriana Cervantes explains that “[u]nlike judicial opinions, books, articles, 
and television, Twitter and live-blogs have no editorial oversight. Anyone with 
email and Internet access can tweet about whatever they want, regardless of 
validity.”93 As such, trial information that “was once mediated and filtered by 
                                                                                                                                            
89  A salient example is the trial of Senator Mike Duffy, which was live-blogged by numerous news 
organizations, including the CBC, the National Post, and Maclean’s. The Hill Times’ coverage included a copy 
of all the exhibits tendered during the proceedings. See e.g. “Mike Duffy Trial Court Exhibits”, The Hill 
Times (8 April 2015), online: The Hill Times <www.hilltimes.com/2015/04/08/duffy-trial-exhibits/ 
41706>. 
90  One example came during the recent trial of Dzhorkhar Tsarnaev, the 21-year-old Chechen-American 
facing the death penalty for the 2013 Boston Marathon bombing. Cameras were not allowed in the federal 
courtroom in which he was tried; however, live-blogging was permitted by various news outlets. The 
Twitter feeds of the press were interspersed with a number of photographs, including shots of key 
locations involved and photographs of the victims. See e.g. Hillary Sargent et al, “Boston’s Ex-Top Cop: 
Death Penalty ‘Should Be Considered’ in Tsarnaev Trial”, Boston.com (8 April 2015), online: Boston.com 
<www.boston.com/news/local/massachusetts/2015/03/04/live-updates-from-the-dzhokhar-tsarnaev-
trial/I5TiQaxX3KEmRafWjWi9LI/story.html>. 
91  Thomas Pierce, “Bloggers Join Frenzy at Media-Saturated Libby Trial”, NPR (1 February 2007), online: 
NPR <www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=7098188>. 
92  Ibid. 
93  Adriana C Cervantes, “Will Twitter Be Following You Into the Courtroom? Why Reporters Should Be 
Allowed to Broadcast During Courtroom Proceedings” (2011) Hastings Comm & Ent LJ 133 at 153. 
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news organizations can be shared peer-to-peer” without any corporate or 
organizational oversight.94 Equally, authorial control over this information is 
relinquished once it hits the web because, as Mary Long notes, “[a]ttempts to 
retract a tweet are pretty pointless. Once it’s out there and endlessly retweeted, 
which always happens during live-tweeted happenings, particularly ones involving 
death and destruction, there’s no way to go back to every person that tweet has 
touched and give them the correct information.”95 As tweets and live-blogs can 
be volleyed around endlessly in multiple, non-linear online discussions, they 
fundamentally diverge from the largely static narratives of news articles of the 
past, which circulated in print within a defined geographic area and were put out 
to pasture in archives once the news cycle moved on.  
Secondly, as the trajectory of this information is radically unknown, so too 
is its fate: it may be “buried in this vast new attention economy if [it] does not 
capture the imagination quickly and strongly enough; or [it] may be amplified, 
sustained and potentially morphed as [it is] re-circulated, reworked, and reframed 
by online networks.”96 Legal scholar Geoffrey Leane underscores this point: 
“This is scattered, one-to-many communication as compared to the one-to-one 
dialogue of the telephone and few-to-many monologues of mass media. In that 
sense it can be more inclusive and simply more ‘public.’”97 Hence, it appears apt 
to conclude that, unlike print or editorial news of the past, “[i]n the social media 
sphere, news is word of mouth on steroids. It knows no boundaries.”98  
Lastly, as the communicative medium has changed, the complexity and 
nature of its associated actors are also fundamentally different. The Internet is a 
sphere of relative anonymity in which individuals are granted a liberating and 
                                                                                                                                            
94  Barb Palser, “The Twitter Death Epidemic” (2012) 34(1) Am Journalism Rev 60 at 60. 
95  Mary C Long, “The Media Needs to Stop Guessing and Set Standards for Live-Tweeting ‘Breaking’ 
News”, Adweek (13 February 2013), online: Adweek <www.adweek.com/socialtimes/media-live-tweeting-
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96  Luke Goode, “Social News, Citizen Journalism and Democracy” (2009) 11 New Media & Soc’y 1287 at 
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Through Public Discourse?” (2010) 23 Can JL & Jur 373 at 380. 
98  Jennifer Alejandro, “Journalism in the Age of Social Media” (2010) Reuters Institute Fellowship Paper, 
University of Oxford, online: Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism <reutersinstitute.politics.ox. 
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sometimes toxic99 power to create their own identities as they see fit. In the 
context of Twitter, authorial identities are loosely and impersonally defined. 
Unlike identity-based services such as Facebook, Twitter does not impose a “real 
name” policy that compels users to reveal their true identities. Instead, Twitter 
and other micro-blogging services give users the choice as to how they want to 
be identified in an effort to aid free speech and association for those who would 
otherwise risk being personally linked to a controversial topic or group.100 This 
ability to speak anonymously is a clear deviation from traditional editorials or 
mass media journalism, where an author’s authority and integrity rests heavily on 
his or her byline. Therefore, accountability for one’s speech, characterized by the 
risk of identification, reputational harm, and real-life consequences, is often an 
absent threat when it comes to using digital media in court. 
C.  Electronic Media Policies in Canadian Courtrooms 
Turning from the content of live-blogging to the nature of its regulation, the 
majority of Canadian provinces and territories have updated their policies on 
electronic device use in court since 2012. However, actual policies and procedures 
on mobile technology and social media use in Canadian courts can vary greatly 
across jurisdictions and levels of court. Crucially, each provincial, territorial, and 
federal court may have different rules on the subject, as there is no limit on their 
divergence from one another.101 As a result, a “patchwork quilt” of regulation has 
developed around the use of digital technologies in the courtroom, making it 
difficult to draw definitive conclusions about its normalization in the judicial 
context.102  
                                                                                                                                            
99  In a recent judgment, Halifax Provincial Court Judge Anne Derrick ruminated on the “harm caused by the 
callous exploitation of Internet anonymity” in the context of the online cyberbullying of a teen, 
underscoring online anonymity’s insidious qualities in protecting and promoting socially malevolent 
conduct: see R v Y, 2015 NSPC 14 at para 1, 357 NSR (2d) 340. 
100  Jeffrey Rosen, “The Delete Squad: Google, Twitter, Facebook and the New Global Battle Over the Future 
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102  Ibid. 
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In Canada, courtroom policies on electronic media use differ according to 
two key areas of debate. Firstly, policies differ on whether transmitting 
information electronically from inside the courtroom to the outside world is 
presumptively prohibited but subject to the approval of the presiding judge, or 
whether it is presumptively permitted, subject to judicial disapproval in 
exceptional circumstances. For example, Quebec has one of the most notorious 
blanket bans on electronic device use in its courtrooms. Accredited members of 
the media, lawyers, and the public alike are all prohibited from communicating 
observations or information from inside the courtroom via electronic media 
without the judge’s consent.103 Saskatchewan courts have similarly imposed a 
blanket ban on digital media use in the courtroom, unless the court otherwise 
permits.104 Under this approach, the accredited media and the general public are 
on equal footing when it comes to social media use.  
Secondly, even where live-blogging and electronic device use are permitted, 
policies differ as to who is allowed to use this technology from one province to 
the next. For instance, only legal counsel and accredited members of the media 
are allowed to use electronic devices to disseminate live text-based 
communication from the courtrooms of Manitoba105 and the Northwest 
Territories.106 Meanwhile, members of the public are not permitted to transmit 
electronic information from inside the courtroom.107 The rules in Ontario are 
slightly softer, as the Superior Court of Justice permits media, as well as counsel, 
court staff, and members of the legal profession, to use electronic devices in the 
                                                                                                                                            
103  Prior to 2013, Quebec courts allowed journalists to use social media for reporting inside courtrooms. 
According to an interview given by the Associate Chief Justice of Quebec’s Superior Court, Justice Robert 
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Courts <www.manitobacourts.mb.ca/site/assets/files/1133/electronic_device_policy.pdf>. 
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courtroom; however, members of the public can only do so with judicial 
permission.108 There is consensus around at least one regulatory aspect: regardless 
of region, no court observer in Canada—journalist or layperson—is allowed to 
record audio or video of the proceedings or to take photographs in court without 
prior judicial permission.  
On May 15, 2014, Nova Scotia officially (albeit quietly) adopted one of the 
most permissive policies on courtroom use of electronic devices in Canada.109 
This new policy allows journalists and members of the public to bring electronic 
devices, including laptops and cell phones into most Nova Scotia courts, 
including the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal, for the purposes of live 
publishing or live communication, including texting, blogging, or tweeting.110 In 
crafting this policy, Nova Scotia consciously decided against implementing a 
more restrictive, ask-for-permission-first rule. Instead, the courts have placed the 
onus on the presiding judge to implement, justify, and enforce any electronic 
device ban.111 In less than one year, the use of Twitter in Nova Scotia courtrooms 
has had a significant impact in the province. Case in point: its use during the 
sexual assault trial of criminal defence lawyer Lyle Howe made national headlines 
after Chief Justice Joseph Kennedy of the Nova Scotia Supreme Court lauded the 
role of this technology in expanding the audience and the quality of the trial’s 
coverage.112  
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III. THE GOOD NEWS: JUSTIFYING DIGITAL MEDIA USE ON THE BASIS OF THE 
OPEN COURT PRINCIPLE 
A.  Accountability and Freedom of Information  
Live-blogging in the courtroom by journalists and the public is supported 
on the basis that it further demystifies the judicial process, which, despite the 
open court principle, “remains shrouded in mysterious ritual” to the eyes of 
many.113 As noted in Part I, the notion of transparency has long been entangled 
with the integrity of the justice system, as the democratic legitimization of judicial 
power flows from the public’s collective confidence in the legal system as an 
impartial and independent arbiter of rights. For critics, exposing the courtroom 
to a virtual audience would have the effect of promoting its accountability to both 
the general public and to those associated with the case who were unable to attend 
in person, including family and friends of the parties.114 The logic here is simple: 
the more open that the process is in terms of witnesses and the more extensive 
its public record, the less likely it is that judges and members of the court will 
stray from the proper administration of justice. Support for live-blogging on the 
basis of increased public oversight is evident in the words of Chief Justice 
Kennedy, who welcomed digital media into Nova Scotia courtrooms by 
acknowledging that the “whole premise [of the courts] is based on the fact that 
we think an informed public will have confidence in [them]. We think that the 
more they know, the better off we’re going to be. Twitter is the latest technology 
that allows it.”115  
The right to live-blog courtroom proceedings has also been cast as a 
fundamental issue of access for those positioned outside the courtroom. As 
digital media can provide information to citizens “with an immediacy and 
thoroughness never before available,” anyone with Internet access can monitor a 
trial as it unfolds without having to traverse the physical barriers that have long 
kept courtrooms both paradoxically open and closed.116 Moreover, given that the 
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information transmitted about the parties, witnesses, and action can far surpass 
that of a traditional newspaper article or even a written judgment, the public may 
be better equipped to make an informed and empathetic analysis of the case. 
Sujoy Chatterjee explains: “An informed public that knows the names, 
backgrounds, and socio-economic conditions of the people involved in…court 
cases will be better equipped to critique a particular court decision in the hope of 
creating real social change.”117 In this sense, social media’s ability to transmit vast 
quantities of information, which can be augmented by links and images as 
discussed in Part II, directly aligns with the democratic ideal of opening up the 
courtroom for the world to see its contents and to judge its outcome. As Charles 
Nesson eloquently puts it, tweeting and live-blogging can “facilitate [the] coveted 
ideal [of the open court principle] and allow the whispers, now made in the inner 
rooms of our public courthouses, to be proclaimed from the digital roof tops for 
all to hear.”118  
B.  Freedom of Expression: Open Court Meets Court of Public Opinion  
Conversely, live-blogging during a court proceeding has also been 
championed as a right of access for those positioned inside the courtroom on the 
basis of the freedom of expression guarantee under section 2(b) of the Charter. 
Specifically, section 2(b) has been used to challenge any distinction between 
journalists and non-journalists’ permitted use of digital media in court—a division 
reinforced by some of the policies of different jurisdictions and at different levels 
of court across Canada, as discussed in Part II. Though the debate in Canada 
regarding discrimination of access in this regard is nascent, prominent media law 
scholar Michael Geist has challenged the tendency to privilege the accredited 
media’s right to live-blog court proceedings to the exclusion of all others on the 
basis that it fundamentally conflicts with section 2(b)’s inclusive guarantee. 
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According to Geist, the Ontario Superior Court’s ban on general public tweeting 
is arguably unconstitutional: 
Either everyone should be free to tweet or no one should…but to limit 
“authorized tweeting” to a special group is “enormously problematic.” 
[This ban] leaves journalism students, freelancers, bloggers, and 
responsible citizens who wish to attend trials and communicate about 
them in a situation that is likely to end in a violation of their rights…. 
Presumptively banned from using the same communications medium 
as reporters, they can be kicked out if they try, and charged with 
contempt. Under the Charter, “everyone” has the right to freedom of 
expression, including freedom of the press and other media of 
communication.”119 
Others have made equivalent arguments on section 2(b) grounds, noting that 
what previously entitled journalists to act as the exclusive purveyors of courtroom 
content was their hegemonic control over mass media in a print-based 
economy.120 Since this hegemony has declined in the Internet’s wake, the justice 
system, in upholding section 2(b), is correspondingly compelled to accommodate 
a world in which everyone has an equal ability to report from the courts.121 In this 
vein, critics have pointed out the capricious underpinnings of a ban on the 
public’s live-blogging, contending that 
…the policy is simply unfair and arbitrary. […] [I]n the case of 
courtrooms, the access provided [to] journalists and non-journalists is 
basically the same. Indeed, barring exceptional circumstances, 
courtrooms are open to anyone who can get there. […] [I]mposing a 
class structure on attendees in open court is untenable.122  
Consequently, if information dissemination is held as a public service and not a 
consumer good,123 and the media is accepted under section 2(b) as having no 
freedom of expression rights in the courtroom over and above those of average 
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citizens, distinctions drawn between the accredited media and the public may 
indeed prove legally flawed. 
Support for live-blogging courtroom proceedings and discrediting class 
distinctions drawn in this regard also stems from a promotion of the model of 
discursive democracy outlined above in Part I. Drawing on the work of theorists 
including Lon Fuller, recall that the Supreme Court of Canada and legal scholars 
such as Jeremy Waldron held that the fair functioning of the liberal democratic 
order required civilian access to information and the attendant opportunity to 
deliberate upon that information critically. Since critics like Waldron suggest the 
law itself is a site of civic contestation and debate, public institutions like the 
courts have an obligation to provide citizens with the information they need to 
actively resist dominant judicial interpretations of their civic rights and 
obligations. Though previously undiscussed, implicit in this argument is the 
assumption that the public has access to communal sites of information exchange 
in which they are able to freely engage in political and social debate regarding the 
law without government interference or censorship.124 
The Internet, in its ability to generate infinite knowledge and function as a 
medium for human interaction free from temporal and spatial boundaries, has 
been cast as the locus for civic debate in the 21st century.125 Generally, the 
Internet is a sphere of inclusivity and unconstrained dialogue—elements critical 
to a democratic system of information exchange and argument.126 In this light, 
scholar Geoffrey Leane explains the Internet’s normative function as it relates to 
deliberative discourse:  
The grea[t] ambition for the Internet as a communicative medium is 
that it can facilitate not only access to information and data but also 
the possibility of narrative exchange and collective will formation—
the opportunity to become informed, to argue and to reach reasoned 
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and rational positions which might become part of a public sphere 
consensus.127 
Through platforms like Twitter, which open up inclusive public space for the 
exchange of information and perspectives, civilians may discover increased 
opportunities “for political communication and engagement, for political 
contestation—and thus for agency.”128 The emancipatory power of these online 
communities are further evidenced by the fact that users can overcome traditional 
barriers to political recognition, including race or gender, in the anonymous world 
of online discourse.  
If live accounts of trials are wellsprings for an informed citizenry, the online 
public debate that encircles these virtual watering holes may subsequently enrich 
“both the substantive positions of participants and also their political selves as 
citizens.”129 As enthusiasm for deliberative democracy in liberal societies is 
“driven by a perceived distance between the drives and motivations of citizens 
and the political decisions made in their name,” live-blogging in all its 
informational immediacy may be able to narrow the temporal distance between 
lawmaker and subject, as the latter is able to instantly respond to the actions of 
the former.130 Emphasizing the narrowing distance between the judge and the 
public, Charles Nesson suggests:  
[The] Internet can provide a vision of the future in which the court is 
truly recognized as a public place. This is a concept that harkens back 
to the original idea of trials from a foundational time of our nation, 
when trials were the cent[re] of community activity….131 
Thus, live-blogging may offer a nexus between conversations about the law both 
inside and outside the walls of the courtroom, functioning as an inclusive and 
interactive site for public debate not yet experienced in the often staid world of 
discourse about the courts.  
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IV. THE BAD NEWS: THE RISKS OF DIGITAL MEDIA USE IN THE COURTROOM 
“When you’re trying to correct things through Twitter alone, it’s a losing battle from the 
beginning. […] You end up chasing Tweets that spread faster than you can keep up; it’s like 
putting toothpaste back in the tube, except the toothpaste is alive and didn’t like it in the tube 
and is dreaming of Broadway.”132  
—DAVID HOLMES 
A.  Twitter and the Troubling Search for Truth 
Despite these strong arguments in favour of live-blogging, problems 
inherent in its use persist. First and foremost, the Supreme Court has held that 
the open court principle fundamentally operates on the assumption that the 
reporting of legal information will be done in an accurate and fair manner.133 
Critics, in turn, have argued that this presumption is an indispensable element to 
the practical operation of the open court principle, insofar as it relieves judges, in 
the absence of countervailing evidence, of the onerous task of having to vet or 
screen the integrity of the press when presiding in full view of the media.134 The 
requirement for accurate reporting is undeniably crucial, as the Supreme Court in 
Edmonton Journal recognized that truthful and clear reporting of the law’s content 
is necessary for individuals to understand their legal obligations and entitle-
ments.135 Likewise, returning to the analysis of the law through theorists such as 
Fuller and Waldron, the clear manifestation of its content affords individuals the 
critical capacity to apply the law to their own behaviour through self-governance, 
and lends stability and predictability to the lives of citizens in a manner that 
underscores their dignity as legal subjects capable of self-determination.  
Nonetheless, in a media landscape where Twitter and other live-blogging 
platforms act as frenetic sources of information, it is apparent that falsehoods will 
be made in quantities and qualities never before seen, threatening public 
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perception of the clarity and determinate nature of the law’s content. On a basic 
level, misrepresentations may be made by accident and by anyone: a misquotation, 
an incorrect name, or a detail that was to remain off the record. However, in the 
great echo chamber of the Internet, these slips will nevertheless travel in large 
circles, and critics warn that corrections—if they come—may not come in time 
to prevent people from walking away with mistaken impressions of reality.136 On 
a more malevolent level, those outside the accredited media may intentionally 
circulate misinformation, as occurred recently when Oscar Pistorius’ supporters 
took to social media to deliberately recast key facts during his trial for murder.137  
Similarly, anonymous sources of information may take advantage of the lack 
of oversight and accountability to skew facts in a manner beneficial to their point 
of view, either by decontextualizing information to present it in a different light 
or by emphasizing choice bits of information that are inflammatory outside of 
the complete narrative.138 As these retweeted reframings could still be linked to 
an established media source, a veneer of credibility may problematically gloss over 
otherwise unreliable information.139 Lastly, between accident and intent lies a host 
of other troubling states, including insufficient objectivity,140 voyeurism, gossip, 
speculation,141 half-truths,142 and bare sensationalism.143 Whatever the method 
and motive, the risk of distortion is real and the challenges of effectively 
containing the viral spread of misinformation in large-scale social networks are 
substantial.144 
This problem raises a secondary concern involving individuals’ online truth-
seeking behaviour, or lack thereof. Simply put, as the Internet presents individuals 
                                                                                                                                            
136  Lara Pierpoint, “Fukushima, Facebook and Feeds: Informing the Public in a Digital Era” (2011) 24 The 
Electricity Journal 53 at 53.  
137  Daniel Bitoni, “Courtroom in the Twitter Age: Who to Follow During the Oscar Pistorius Trial”, CTV 
News (3 March 2014), online: <www.ctvnews.ca/world/courtroom-in-the-twitter-age-who-to-follow-
during-the-oscar-pistorius-trial-1.1711683>. 
138  Pierpoint, supra note 136 at 55. 
139  Ibid at 54. 
140  Leane, supra note 97 at 384. 
141  Chief Justice Beverley McLachlin, “Courts, Transparency and Public Confidence – To the Better 
Administration of Justice” (2003) 8 Deakin Law Review 1 at 2. 
142  Nesson, supra note 118 at 384. 
143  McLachlin, supra note 1. 
144  Nam P Nguyen, Guanhua Yan & My T Thai, “Analysis of Misinformation Containment in Online Social 
Networks” (2013) 57 Computer Networks 2133 at 2133. 
Vol. 24 Dalhousie Journal of Legal Studies 133 
	
with massive quantities of information, their filtering mechanisms—which are 
premised on their preconceptions, biases, and prejudices—can often become 
survivalist techniques. Geoffrey Leane explains: 
Given the sheer quantity of information available in complex modern 
societies and now relatively accessible in unprecedented quantities on 
the Internet, information seekers typically need a filtering process that 
renders incoming information reasonably manageable, comprehen-
sible, and amenable to analysis. One can self-select filters to suit one’s 
own needs, interests and preferences. But therein lies the corollary 
problem of too much filtering.145 
On the topic of “too much filtering,” technology critics have warned users about 
the tunnel vision effect that the Internet has on individuals’ search for truth, 
noting that while the  
…advantage of technology is that it allows people to filter information 
and customize their selection, this advantage at the same time limits 
people’s exposure. Because the Internet allows users to visit websites 
that are very specialized and often geared towards specific audiences, 
the Internet eliminates an element of randomness, reduces exposure 
to a variety of views and perspectives, and potentially creates a biased 
worldview.146 
As individuals’ egocentrism may dominate their online information-seeking 
behaviours, their freedom to “self-select…information sites, news and opinions 
[may] simply confirm [their] prejudices and [cause them to] become more 
politically segregated and intolerant.”147 
On this point it is important to emphasize that critics see the self-filtering 
nature of online information as a break from traditional news media of the past. 
For instance, Leane writes: 
Modern mass media have traditionally served as filtering devices and, 
whilst self-selecting themselves, at least exposed readers and viewers 
to some variety of perspectives in, for example, editorial pages of print 
media. We may choose our newspaper and preferred editorial writers 
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on the basis of our personal predilections but our attention might still 
be caught by others. […] There is at least the possibility of inadvertent 
exposure to contrary arguments and opinions. Not so with pre-chosen 
Internet sites if one so wishes.148 
Returning to the context of truth-seeking in the midst of misinformation, 
individuals are unlikely to recognize a falsehood if they do not seek or gain 
exposure to alternative perspectives and narratives. Therefore, misinformation 
about the law will be increasingly rooted in the social discourse of live-blogging, 
as it meets the radical grounds for confirmation bias laid by the Internet.  
When competing narratives emerge for a single court proceeding, it may be 
difficult to discern fiction from fact, particularly as the information travels further 
away from its original source. In the context of the open court principle, reliance 
on live-blogging and Twitter as mechanisms for dissemination thus troublingly 
places the truth-seeking function of the open court principle in direct tension 
with its deliberative function. The problem is deceptively simple: the more 
opportunity there is to create multiple narratives regarding judicial proceedings, 
the more likely it is that misinformation will be produced and that mistakes will 
be made. As a result, the ability for individuals to self-govern on the basis of legal 
determinacy, which the publicity principle is supposed to ensure, is fundamentally 
weakened, as the deliberative conversation surrounding the law amplifies. 
Furthermore, the problem begs a choice as to which critical facet of the open 
court principle deserves to be privileged: is it the self-determinative function, 
which underscores individuals’ human dignity in their self-governance, or is it the 
self-deliberative function, which underscores individuals’ human dignity in their 
engagement in public debate and action?  
For theorists like Waldron, the conflict between legal clarity and public 
conversation arising from the publicity principle comes as little surprise and offers 
little resolution. Waldron explicitly highlights how these dual values of democratic 
order can come into tension with one another, writing that the argumentative 
nature of deliberative democracy “has a price: it probably brings with it a 
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diminution in law’s certainty.”149 Elsewhere, Waldron explicitly brings Fuller into 
the fold, asserting: 
The tension may be also represented as a tension between various 
strands of dignity associated with the Rule of Law. Fuller, we saw, 
associated his formal criteria with a dignitarian conception of the legal 
subject as an agent capable of monitoring and freely governing his own 
conduct. […] But how, it may be asked, can we maintain this mode of 
respect if law becomes contestable and uncertain as the result of 
argumentation? Insisting on an opportunity for argumentation 
respects dignity too but at the cost of diminishing the confidence that 
we can have in the dignity of law’s self-application at the hands of 
ordinary individuals.150 
Importantly, in Waldron’s account there does not appear to be any way in which 
the deliberative and determinative dimensions of informational freedom can be 
reconciled. By way of conclusion, he notes: 
To say that we should value aspects of governance that promote the 
clarity and determinacy of rules for the sake of individual freedom, but 
not the opportunities for argumentation that a free and self-possessed 
individual is likely to demand, is to slice in half, to truncate, what the 
Rule of Law rests upon: respect for the freedom and dignity of each 
person as an active intelligence.151 
Consequently, the formal qualities of clarity, predictability, and determinacy 
simply bend with the “positive freedom” of individuals to actively engage in the 
administration of public affairs.152 It is this bending of the truth to accommodate 
deliberate discourse that appears particularly acute in the context of digital media 
in the courtroom, as the free flow of information presents itself in all its possibility 
and forbiddance in this novel form of publicity.  
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B.  Publication Bans and Lingering Challenges of Free Expression  
Barring digital media use from the courtrooms on the basis that it obscures 
the truth by creating multiple and potentially divergent narratives is deeply 
problematic for two reasons. Firstly, the Supreme Court in Mentuck held that once 
information has entered the public domain of the courtroom, access to 
disseminate this information should be denied only where its publication would 
present a real and substantial risk to the proper administration of justice (e.g. a 
risk to the accused’s section 11(d) Charter right to a fair trial), and where the 
salutary effects of denying access outweigh the deleterious effects.153 In framing 
this common law test for imposing a publication ban, the Supreme Court held 
that the risk to the administration of justice must be grave and non-speculative; a 
generalized assertion of a risk,154 or a fear based on “common sense and logic 
alone, without the benefit of real and substantial evidence,”155 is not sufficient. 
Finally, under this test, the Supreme Court concluded that publication bans 
should be ordered only in exceptional cases.156  
This threshold for publication bans—meant to uphold freedom of speech 
in relation to the open court principle—is thus unquestionably high. To this end, 
the test may pose issues in jurisdictions like Nova Scotia where live-tweeting is 
presumptively allowed, but where the judge has concerns that a truthful account 
of its proceedings may be obscured, distorted, or lost in the volley of tweeting. 
Such circumstances may arise during highly controversial or sensational cases, 
where media scrutiny and public attendance are atypically intense. In these 
circumstances, implementing a ban on publication via digital media based on a 
desire to preserve a ‘correct’ or uncontested narrative might not rise beyond the 
level of speculative evidence of harm to the administration of justice. This would 
be an untenable ground on which to exercise judicial discretion under the 
Dagenais/Mentuck test.157 Moreover, given the fact that sensational, high-stakes 
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criminal cases attract most publicity, the judge may be simultaneously under 
pressure to allow extensive trial coverage to ensure the accused’s right to a fair 
trial under section 11(d) of the Charter. 
Secondly, judicial attempts to ban social media use on the basis that it leads 
to multiple, contestable narratives may attract suspicion of censoring the public’s 
freedom of speech. Such bans have been strongly criticized by scholars as 
obstructionist and self-interested. It is important to see that judicial decisions are, 
in the words of Elaine Craig, “normative—they make a claim to truth. ‘Every 
judicial narrative is a claim of knowledge. […] When judges narrate, our initial 
reaction is to treat their narration as an accurate reflection of reality.’”158 As a 
result, in a scathing critique of the justice system’s attempt to limit trial 
information to the ultimate judgment at the expense of alternative media’s 
involvement, Charles Nesson wrote: 
The courts are trying to contain the news. The courts are trying to 
manage the content released to the world. The courts are trying to 
create their vision of trial—a vision of an isolated proceeding in which 
a record is carefully crafted and submitted as truth. This record 
provides justification for the judicial result and is ideally not vulnerable 
to media assaults along the way. The courts are trying to avoid the 
commenting and critiquing that comes with sensational trial[s]; they 
are trying to avoid the talking heads.159 
Based on these concerns, judges may find themselves in uncomfortable positions 
as they attempt to harness digital media’s potential, while avoiding unjust 
infringements on free speech. Thus, out of concern for similar cries of 
obfuscation or censorship of section 2(b)’s freedom of expression, judges may be 
                                                                                                                                            
The trial judge granted the application on the condition that the media not broadcast certain portions of 
the tape showing Smith’s actual death, but on appeal the Ontario Court of Appeal held that this was an 
impermissible attempt to control the content of speech outside the courtroom. At para 50 the Court held 
that “absent any finding of potential harm or injury to a legally protected interest, there is nothing in the law 
that permits a judge to impose his or her opinion about what does not need to be broadcast to the general public. That would 
be inconsistent with the constitutional protection our legal order accords freedom of expression and 
freedom of the press” [emphasis added]. While this case was about televising trial exhibits, it nonetheless 
underscores that freedom of expression seemingly limits a judge’s ability to control the judicial narrative in 
the hands of others. 
158  Elaine Craig, “Person(s) of Interest and Missing Women: Legal Abandonment in the Downtown Eastside” 
(2014) 60:1 McGill LJ 1 at 20 [emphasis in original]. 
159  Nesson, supra note 118 at 398. 
138 DIGITAL MEDIA IN THE COURTROOM Vol. 24 
forced to cede control over the flow of information in a manner that makes them 
“just a participant in a connective community, rather than the person in control 
of a legal process.”160 Consequently, while the fight may be waged between the 
normative value of the law’s content and the discursive nature of its debate in the 
context of the open court principle, freedom of speech under section 2(b) may 
be the ultimate trump card, particularly in circumstances where the courts have 
already brought digital media technologies into the fold. 
V. CONCLUSION AND LOOKING AHEAD 
Ultimately, the unsettled future of digital media in Canadian courtrooms and 
the patchwork quilt of policies that have sprung up to address judicial concerns 
in its regard point to the profoundly disruptive potential that this technology has 
for the justice system. This technology is not, as some critics suggest, merely an 
extension of pen and paper journalism. It is a new way of thinking about 
information dissemination—both within and beyond the courtroom—and 
provides an unrivalled ability to disseminate larger quantities of information to an 
awaiting public, at a speed and with a sense of immediacy that far surpasses 
conventional media. It is a form of dissemination that has serious benefits, 
particularly in its ability to open the courts up to public scrutiny and to demystify 
proceedings by ensuring more individuals are able to witness a trial unfold before 
their eyes and at their fingertips. Attempts to stifle the integration of digital media 
in the courtroom are thus met with valid resistance on the basis of public 
accountability and accessibility, norms which are at the heart of both the legal 
system and the democratic system of governance to which it belongs. 
At the same time, inherent in digital media’s promises are its problems, 
especially its fundamental ambivalence regarding the open court principle as the 
source of both legal clarity and contestation. Accordingly, in deciding whether to 
allow digital media use in the courtroom, the justice system may need to decide 
which of the longstanding normative values supporting the open court principle 
ought to be given decisive weight in modern society. It remains unclear how this 
quandary will be reconciled, as the current patchwork quilt of policies regarding 
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digital technology use in Canadian courtrooms suggests that consensus 
surrounding this choice is elusive.  
What is clear, however, is that digital media technology has a profound 
ability to both complement and complicate the administration of justice in novel 
ways. As Chief Justice Beverley McLachlin eloquently stated,  
The open courtroom remains as essential today as it was in Bentham’s 
time. Yet the omnipresent and immediate reach of modern dissemin-
ation networks makes it increasingly apparent that openness may exact 
costs—costs that require judges and the media to reassess the means 
by which they further the principle of open justice.161 
Regardless of the outcome, an analysis of the open court principle and all its 
pressing practical concerns in the context of digital media helps, as Jeremy 
Waldron has written, to “bring our conceptual thinking about the law to life”: 
There is a distressing tendency among academic legal philosophers to 
see law simply as a set of normative propositions and to pursue their 
task of developing an understanding of the concept of law to consist 
simply in understanding what sort of normative propositions these are. 
But law comes to life in institutions. An understanding of legal systems 
that emphasizes argument in the courtroom as much as the existence 
and recognition of rules provides the basis for a much richer 
understanding of the values and requirements that law and legality 
represent in modern political argument.162 
The open court principle, as it currently stands in practice, demonstrates these 
nuanced and contextual intersections between theory and practicality as it relates 
to the deployment of legal institutions on a ground level. For this reason, the 
open court principle provides an incredibly rich and ongoing topic of conver-
sation, and one that will continue to evolve in the coming years.  
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